Israelis turned out in their highest numbers in decades on Oct. 27 to elect a new government, but the results have left the country in a stalemate.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu鈥檚 governing bloc dropped precipitously, from 68 seats to 53, far short of the 61 needed for a Knesset majority. But the four opposition parties hoping to replace him are far from guaranteed to do so. They won 48 seats and would need the support of two predominantly Arab parties, which won a historic high of 19, to unseat Netanyahu鈥檚 government.

These opposition parties, led by former Israeli military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, now face a choice: They can form a government that relies on the votes of Arab and non-Zionist parties, which is particularly controversial since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack; they can form a unity government with Netanyahu, on the condition that he sheds some of his ultra-Orthodox and far-right partners; or they can force a rerun of the election in the spring.

While the machinations of Israeli government formation may seem too esoteric or irrelevant to matter to most Americans, extended political chaos in Israel, and the makeup of whatever government eventually emerges, will have a real impact on American interests and foreign policy 鈥� not only on the trajectory of the U.S.-Israel relationship but also on the agenda of President Donald Trump and his administration for the rest of his term.

The United States has a wide-ranging set of goals in the Middle East: resolving the Iran conflict one way or another, stabilizing and safeguarding American allies and partners, and overseeing a transition in Gaza from Hamas rule to a new Palestinian administration. All of these goals require Israeli buy-in, which is far harder to get if Israel goes months without a new government and then heads into another election campaign.

With Netanyahu and his government still in place, that means a continued push from him for renewed military action against Iran to protect his hawkish bona fides with right-wing voters. It also means his continued block on arrangements designed to begin building alternative security and political institutions in Gaza.

Efforts across multiple administrations to better integrate Israel into the region will remain frozen so long as Israel has only a caretaker government. And it will be harder to get the United States and Israel on the same page on Lebanon and Syria if the Israeli government can鈥檛 afford flexibility while another election campaign is bitterly fought. Political instability in any American partner complicates U.S. foreign policy. In this case, it is unfolding in a particularly important partner, and in a particularly intractable way.

There is also the question of what a new government will look like once the deadlock is resolved, and that has important implications, too. The steep drop in Israel鈥檚 favorability and standing in the United States, cutting across both parties and different demographics, is primarily connected to the Netanyahu government and its policies.

Republicans are skeptical of Israel鈥檚 role in an increasingly unpopular Iran war that many see as only tangentially connected to core American interests, while Democrats overwhelmingly disapprove of Israeli military actions in Gaza and Israeli policies in the West Bank.

Congressional Democrats still bristle at the memory of Netanyahu鈥檚 2015 address to Congress, aimed at derailing President Barack Obama鈥檚 nuclear negotiations with Iran. And they resent Netanyahu鈥檚 open embrace of Trump and Republicans, with barely a pretense of appealing to both sides of the aisle.

Should the Israeli opposition fail to form a different government, or throw Netanyahu a political lifeline by joining him when he lacks the numbers to rebuild his coalition, it will accelerate the decline in the U.S.-Israel relationship.

With Democrats favored to flip the House in the Nov. 3 midterm elections, and possibly the Senate, a repeat of Netanyahu鈥檚 far-right government 鈥� whose prospects improve if the election is rerun 鈥� will mean constant friction over what Israel鈥檚 own security services have called 91传媒 terrorism against Palestinians, Israeli settlement policy that is de facto annexing the West Bank and maximalist Israeli military positions in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria 鈥� not to mention the deep disagreement over strikes on Iran.

A unity government with Netanyahu as prime minister might take a slightly softer approach on some of these issues, but keeping Netanyahu as Israel鈥檚 face to the world will continue damaging Israel鈥檚 standing in the United States.

The tight relationship between Trump and Netanyahu masks the real debate over Israel churning in the Republican Party, and Israel鈥檚 standing among Democrats has never been lower.

The U.S.-Israel relationship is important to both sides. Israel鈥檚 reliance on the United States is obvious, but the United States benefits in many arenas, from military coordination and intelligence sharing to cooperation on technical and scientific innovation.

If the relationship erodes to the point where antagonism rather than friendship becomes the norm, both countries will pay for it. That is why Americans should pay close attention to how Israel鈥檚 election gets settled.

Michael Koplow is Israel Policy Forum’s chief policy officer, based in Washington, D.C.